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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 31, 1974


Dear George,

Better late than never -- I hope.


Please forgive my extreme tardiness in responding to your thoughtful note of congratulations on my promotion last August. It was very good of you to write and I greatly appreciate your generous words. Thank you.

May 1975 be very good to you.

Sincerely,


Brent Scowcroft
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. George A. Carver, Jr.
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505



~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

30 December 1974

Mr. Andrew W. Marshall
Director
Net Assessment
Department of Defense

Dear Andy:

Per our November exchange of correspondence and subsequent telephone conversations, I would suggest we think in terms of two lists along the following lines.

The briefings of selected portions of the [redacted] war games would be most helpful to the following senior officers in the Agency and the Office of the DCI:

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The DCI, Mr. Colby
The DDCI, Lt. General Walters
The DDS&T, Mr. Duckett
The DDI, Mr. Proctor
The DCI's Deputy for the Intelligence Community, Lt. General Wilson
The DCI's Deputy for NIOs, Mr. Carver
The NIO for Strategic Programs, Mr. Stoertz
The Assistant (and often acting) NIO for Strategic Programs, [redacted]
The NIO for Conventional Forces, Admiral Bergin
The NIO for the USSR and Eastern Europe, Mr. Whitman

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[redacted] (who is probably our senior analyst on Soviet strategic matters).

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It is not easy to devise the optimum list of people to be briefed on the intelligence inputs and assumptions made about Soviet planning and behavior [redacted]

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The list should include those whose substantive expertise would enable them to make a direct contribution and the need to keep the list small means that in some cases substantively qualified subordinates ought to be included but not their administrative seniors. Our suggestion here for the right mix in light of both these criteria is as follows:

Mr. Knoche, the Director of the Office of Strategic Research

[redacted] the Chief of the Soviet Strategic Forces Division of OSR

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[redacted], the Chief of OSR's Strategic Evaluations Center

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Mr. Hineman, the Director of the Office of Weapons Intelligence

Mr. Lipton, Chief of the Defense Systems Division of the Office of Weapons Intelligence

[redacted] the Assistant NIO for Strategic Programs

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[redacted] the Assistant NIO for Conventional Forces


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Mr. Whitman, the NIO for the USSR and Eastern Europe.

Both of the above lists are subject to negotiation but they reflect the numbers and types of people we have in mind. After you have had a chance to look over the above names, please let me have your reactions and we will see how best to proceed from here to set up these briefings. Bill Colby has asked me to extend to you and the Secretary his thanks for your forthcoming cooperation in this matter.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,



George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

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SUBJECT: Briefings List - to
Andrew Marshall

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O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/mee

Distribution

Orig - Addressee

- 1 - DCI
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - DDS&T
- 1 - DDI
- 1 - D/DCI/IC
- 1 - D/NIO Chrono ✓
- 1 - NIO Net Assessments file
- 1 - NIO/RI

20 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Stoertz
Mrs. Colbert

Mr. Murphy

SUBJECT : [REDACTED]


1. Attached is a copy of Danny Graham's 17 December memorandum to Schlesinger, Clements and Hall regarding cancellation [REDACTED] (Graham gave a copy to the DCI after it had been submitted to its addressees.)

2. During our conversation on 18 December, the Secretary of Defense told me he had not, repeat not, made up his mind about [REDACTED] and any statements to the contrary by anyone were without foundation.


3. On the evening of the 19th, Schlesinger called the DCI -- after a conversation with Hall -- and said over the telephone that the case for cancelling [REDACTED] was perceptibly stronger than he (Schlesinger) had previously realized. Nonetheless, the DCI received the clear impression that Schlesinger still had an open mind on the subject. The DCI will be seeing Schlesinger to discuss [REDACTED] sometime around or after 1700 on 20 December. He plans to take Evan Hineman (Chairman of GMAIC) with him to the meeting.

4. I do not know enough about the technical details involved to have an informed opinion about the utility of [REDACTED] even in the abstract, let alone with respect to the relative advantages that might accrue to the U.S. intelligence effort in spending the considerable sums involved [REDACTED] as opposed to other things (assuming that the funds now earmarked [REDACTED] could be flexibly reprogrammed, which may be an unwarranted assumption). There is, however, one thing I do have the wit to perceive, namely that the [REDACTED] issue is rapidly coming to a head. If any of you have strong feelings on this matter or information you believe the

DCI ought to have as he discusses this matter with the Secretary of Defense, please make sure your feelings or information are communicated to him as quickly as possible.


George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment



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GACarver, Jr./kes

Distribution:

Original - Mr. Stoertz
1 - Mr. Murphy
1 - Mrs. Colbert
1 - D/NIO Chrono

Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	LC		
2	DDCI			12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T	✓		14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI			15	AO/DCI		
6	DDA			16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D/DCI/IC	✓		18			
9	D/DCI/NIO	✓		19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

FYI -

Gen G gave it
to me
Comments? -

DCI/DE

12/14/74

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20 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Stoertz

SUBJECT : ACDA Proposal for a Study of SALT Issues
for the mid-1980's

1. Your memorandum of 16 December (SP - 174/74) was circulated to the DCI, DDCI, DDS&T, DDI and D/DCI/IC. It was discussed at the Executive Committee Meeting on Thursday, 19 December. The unanimous view (including the DCI's) was as follows:

(a) We are indeed justified in believing that the priority on other uses of our analytical resources, and the time-urgency of the mid-1980's problem, are such that heavy commitment to a longer term project of the type ACDA proposes should be deferred at this time.

(b) Clearly some of the questions ACDA raises are valid, serious ones and indeed are being actively considered and worked on. This work, however, has to be concentrated in the areas and against the specific purposes for which it is now being done, e.g., the Verification Panel, SALT support, etc. It would be inappropriate to initiate a new set of projects covering similar ground under different sponsorship quite apart from the fact that the people who would have to do the work are already fully engaged in work they are now doing.


2. The Executive Committee did not specifically address the issue of an ACDA-CIA study as opposed to a NSSM or VPWG study, this matter being left to your judgment and discretion.

3. The DCI did ask that you get in touch with Mr. Eimer and any other interested parties in ACDA to

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convey the flavor of the above response to the ACDA
proposal.



George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

GACarver, Jr./kes


Distribution:

Original - Mr. Stoertz

1 - D/NIO Chrono

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NIO # 2770-24



16 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: *[Signature]* The Director

SUBJECT : ACDA Proposal (Request) for a Comprehensive Study of SALT-Related Issues

1. Attached is a note to me from Howard Stoertz recounting and commenting on an elaborate study of SALT-related issues which has been broached to us (i.e., the NIO/SP) by Fred Eimer, the head of ACDA's Verification Division.
2. My reaction to the proposal is essentially similar to Mr. Stoertz'. ACDA does have responsibilities in the disarmament area, but this proposal seems to me to go well beyond the bounds of what I understand ACDA's charter to be and, if carried out, would get ACDA deeply involved in intelligence matters and judgments which do not seem to me to fall within ACDA's sphere of responsibility. Furthermore, as Howard notes, we simply do not have the assets to devote to this project; since the officers who would have to do the work are already over-extended in work -- both in process and on the near horizon -- directly related to their primary responsibilities.
3. I am sending copies of this package to the addressees noted below and would like to discuss it at an early Executive Committee meeting.

[Signature]
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

SP - 174/74, 16 December 1974

cc: DDCI
DDS&T
DDI
D/DCI/IC



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NIO # 2-763-24

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Office of the Director

SP - 174/74
16 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIO

SUBJECT: ACDA Proposal for Study of SALT Issues for the mid-1980's

George

1. Fred Eimer, head of ACDA's Verification Division, has visited me twice recently to explore and seek my advice about a study of the issues likely to face the US in considering strategic arms limitations for 1985 and beyond, with particular emphasis on the intelligence aspects of such limitations. Eimer says Fred Ikle is personally interested in this project and wants to get work started on it soon. Some guidance from the DCI and his senior staff as to our attitude about the role intelligence people should play, and the resource commitment we are prepared to offer, would be helpful.

2. When Eimer first contacted me on this matter, he brought an outline (attached) which seemed to suggest that the proposed study would be almost exclusively an intelligence estimate. It presented the problem of strategic arms limitation in the mid-1980's as if what mattered was mainly such things as developments in US collection systems and budgets, in Soviet weapon systems, and in Soviet concealment practices. I studied the outline myself, and sent it also to [redacted] Hank Knoche (OSR), and Sayre Stevens (DDS&T) for comment.

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3. The comments of my colleagues and myself were not identical, but there was a common thread, as follows. Any study of this sort which focussed almost exclusively on intelligence aspects would have the tail wagging the dog. The way the US has gone about determining SALT policy in the past, and should in future, is to identify first the kinds of limitations that might be in the US interest because of their intrinsic value to our security and other objectives. Then other considerations, including trends in US, Soviet and other forces, trends in verification capabilities and the challenges to them, impact on US forces and options, negotiability, etc. are analyzed in light of the limitations which are of interest. The study thus is not an intelligence study as such, but one in which the several SALT-related components of government are involved and

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-2-

SP - 174/74

SUBJECT: ACDA Proposal for Study of SALT Issues for the mid-1980's

intelligence makes one of several inputs. Sayre Stevens drew up an informal outline showing this type of approach (also attached), which I have given to Eimer informally, commenting however that I thought it was still probably overly heavy with intelligence considerations.

4. Another common thread in the commentary was that we doubted whether intelligence could in all good conscience promise to put very much of its resources into such an exercise in the near future. This is reaction largely because the negotiations to implement the Vladivostok agreement, with their heavy emphasis on verification questions, as well as the need to gear up collection and analytical assets to monitor that agreement, are going to press us hard between now and mid-1975 at least. This reaction also takes into account the distant nature of the time period ACDA wishes to explore. While both Stevens and I recognize that advance planning for a decade hence will indeed have to commence in a surprisingly short space of time, it does appear that the objective need to commit analytical resources to such a study even before the Vladivostok agreement has been brought to the stage of signature and ratification is questionable.

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5. I told Eimer all of the foregoing, and gave him the alternative outline, when he visited me for the second time last Tuesday. He seemed to appreciate our thoughts, but warned that Ikle is anxious to get something moving soon. He said he'd check out with me any revised ACDA proposal, perhaps in the form of a draft letter to the DCI, and expected this to be before Christmas.

6. The kind of guidance we need, I think, is as follows:

- Are we correct to suggest that any such study should start with issues of interest to the US and should involve the several affected departments and agencies and that intelligence should not bear the primary responsibility for it?
- Are we justified in believing that the priority on other uses of our analytical resources, and the time-urgency of the mid-1980's problem, are such that heavy commitment to such a longer term project should be deferred at this particular time?

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
-3-

SP - 174/74

SUBJECT: ACDA Proposal for Study of SALT Issues for the mid-1980's


-- Would we prefer that ACDA work toward an ACDA-CIA study, which is what ACDA seems to prefer in this case, or that ACDA seek to get a NSSM or a VPWG study authorized so that the participation of other relevant agencies would be assured?

7. If I could get some guidance from the DCI and senior staff on these questions, I think it would be well received by Eimer and that he would take it into account in formulating the proposal Ikle wishes to make.



Howard Stoertz, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

Attachments

cc: Mr. Stevens (DDS&T)
Mr. Knoche (OSR)
 (SALT Staff)
(IC Staff)

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-4-

SP - 174/74

SUBJECT: ACDA Proposal for Study of SALT Issues for the mid-1980's

Distribution:

- 0 - D/DCI/NIO
- 1 - Mr. Stevens (DDS&T)
- 1 - Mr. Knoche (OSR)
- 1 - [redacted] (SALT Staff)
- 1 - [redacted] (IC Staff)
- 1 - NIO/RI
- 1 - NIO/SP

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NIO/SP:HStoertz: [redacted] (16 Dec 74)

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19 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT : KIQ Coordination Disconnects

Sam:

1. We have a continuing problem which I am sure is the result of inadvertent oversight and on which my colleagues and I are sometimes far from blameless. Still, it is a problem which -- if not resolved -- is going to produce a very awkward complication at some particularly inconvenient juncture. The problem in question is the lack of coordination on matters related to KIQs which too often occurs between your associates and mine when either are doing a KIQ-related task for the DCI.

2. The spread sheet on agency commitments in the Strategy Reports is an almost classic example. Bill asked for such a spread sheet (in his terms, "matrix") in his buckslip to me of 29 November, which I passed along to you (after the intervening weekend) by my note of 3 December. In the latter, I called attention to the matrix, suggesting that [] work with your colleagues in developing it. Shortly thereafter, [] called [] (he does not remember which) to volunteer his services and was told that the IC Staff had not yet started working on it but would be back in touch with him. I should have followed this up; but, as you know, got sidetracked by my week-long absence in Honolulu.

3. In point of fact, I never saw the matrix until the pre-USIB on 18 December and I was the first member of the NIO structure to see it. (Indeed, it reached me

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before the pre-USIB only as a result of a call from []
[] Since I was the only recipient of
the matrix, none of my NIO colleagues had had a chance
to look at it; though by that time it was already in the
process of being formally distributed to USIB principals.

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4. The matrix was well done and imaginatively laid out, but the fact remains that the NIOs who supervised the preparation of the Strategy Reports should -- at a minimum -- have had a chance to vet the capsule summary of assignments accepted and the language explaining what this acceptance involved. In point of fact, neither was entirely accurate, particularly the latter, which was inaccurate in a potentially awkward way. (As I asked Colby to note at the meeting, it was not the NIOs who "selected" the tasks, but the representatives of the various USIB members who "volunteered" to accept them. In the real world, the NIOs actually steered these acceptances; but several USIB members, including our colleague Ed Proctor, are very tender-nerved on this point.)

5. For a variety of reasons, including the prevention of such inadvertent glitches, the matrix should have been looked at by my colleagues before anyone else saw it -- including, or indeed especially, the DCI and the other USIB principals. Each NIO should have had a chance to look at the symbolic summary of his own Strategy Reports to verify the latter's accuracy and completeness. Indeed, in my note of 3 December I specifically asked that a draft matrix be developed that you and I could jointly consider before it was shown to Bill Colby.

6. I well recognize that in a fast-breaking ball game where all the players are busy, gears sometimes slip as everyone tries to get his own job done thoroughly within impossible time frames. Nonetheless, I really do think it essential that KIQ-related matters -- especially ones dealing with interpretations of what KIQs mean or contain and ones dealing with performance evaluations -- have to be developed by your colleagues and mine in consultation with each other before they are sent outside our immediate offices. In this, we need to take particular care to ensure that neither of us inadvertently blind-sides the other.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/mee

Distribution:

Orig - General Wilson

1 - KIQ file

1 - D/NIO Chronol

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NIO # ~~10000000~~

18 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
SUBJECT : "Fuzzy KEPS"

Attached is [redacted] revised cut at a "fuzzy KEP." One from Sam Hoskinson will be along shortly, along with some views from Bob Slighton on the extent to which resource costing figures can be cranked in without undue effort. I would like to keep chipping away at this approach to see if we cannot, through it, come close to developing a document that meets your needs without involving large amounts of mechanical reporting and elaborate bookkeeping.

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George A. Carver, Jr.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

[redacted]
"KIQ PERFORMANCE REPORT FOR FY 1974 -- [redacted]
[redacted]

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Copy No. 2 - DDCI

- 1 - ERw/o att
- 1 - NIO/KIQ filew/o att
- 1 - NIO/SSEAw/o att
- 1 - D/NIO Chronow/o att ✓
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NO 2766-74

16 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/ICS
D/OSR
NIO/CF

SUBJECT : J-2 EUCOM Briefing and Indications
and Warning Seminar

REFERENCE : D/NIO memo to General Graham, 4 December 1974

Attached are two cables outlining plans for the briefings and seminar discussed in reference note and attachment. I trust that Danny's people have been in touch with you on this scheduling, that it fits in with your plans, and that you or your representatives will be able to participate in the discussions setting up the seminar. I join in General Ratkovich's hope that the seminar will be a first step in refining and implementing an improved capability in the indications and warning field.

Carver
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachments

DOClose:kes

Distribution:

- Original - D/DCI/ICS w/atts
- 1 - D/OSR w/atts
- 1 - NIO/CF w/atts
- 1 - NIO/CF Soft File (O/D/NIO) w/atts
- 1 - ☐ Chrono w/atts
- 1 - D/NIO Chrono w/atts
- 1 - RI w/o atts

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

NO # 2216-74

7 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William O. Cregar
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : FY 1975 KIQ Strategy Reports

1. Appended to this note is your set of FY 1975 KIQ Strategy Reports plus the DCI's memorandum by which these reports were transmitted to the United States Intelligence Board.

2. While the attached DCI memorandum states that 66 FY 1975 KIQ Strategy Reports are being forwarded to you, your package actually contains 51 Strategies. Per our telephone conversation, it is not possible to send the other 15 due to their security classification and the compartmented controls they require. These additional Strategy Reports are, however, available for your review at either the USIB Secretariat, Room 7C25, or my office, 7E62, in the CIA Headquarters Building.

3. As you recognize, these Strategy Reports -- and the Key Intelligence Questions to which they relate -- are focussed on the U.S. Government's foreign intelligence activities and concerns and not on domestic matters, which are the FBI's responsibility but not that of the (foreign) Intelligence Community.

G.A.C.
George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachments

GACarver, Jr./mee

Distribution:

Original - Addressee w/atts /
1 - GAC Chrono w/atts
1 - KIQ File w/atts
1 - RI w/o atts

Dispatched by USIB Secretariat.

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Attached is the cable I mentioned
relaying Ambassador Martin's views.
He sounds very much like Ambassador
Nolting in early 1963.

George A. Carver, Jr.

5 Dec 74
(DATE)

Attachment
SAIGON

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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NIU # 2636-14

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

JR

4 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Daniel O. Graham, USA
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency

Lt. General Lew Allen, Jr., USAF
Director, National Security Agency/
Chief, Central Security Service

Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community

Mr. John J. Hicks
Director
National Photographic Interpretation
Center

Mr. Enno H. Knoche
Director
Office of Strategic Research

Rear Admiral Daniel E. Bergin, Jr., USN
National Intelligence Officer for
Conventional Forces

SUBJECT : Warsaw Pact Theater Forces

1. As you will recall, on 18 November I sent each of this memorandum's recipients an informal paper prepared by [] surveying the problems involved in our collective continuing responsibility for monitoring the strength and capabilities of Warsaw Pact theater forces. In that memorandum, [] offered certain recommendations for changes in current procedures and the current allocation of responsibilities, recommendations which were offered more as a stimulus

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to discussion than as a definitive answer to this complex problem.

2. I would like to discuss [] sugges-
tions and the larger issues they raise (i.e., where
ought we to go from here). It seems to me that such a
discussion would be most fruitful if it was initially
conducted in an informal setting with only principals
participating (i.e., the recipients of this memorandum).
If we are in accord on how to proceed, our associates
can work out the technical details. The kind of accord
I think we might be able to achieve would not necessar-
ily be a specific set of action steps but, rather,
agreement on the forum or committee through which such
steps could best be developed for your consideration
and ultimate recommendation to the DCI.

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3. Since several of us will be participating in
[] and, hence, will be absent next
week, if it is convenient I would very much like to
convene such a discussion in my office at 1700 on Friday,
6 December. My secretary will be in contact with yours
to ascertain if this is a mutually suitable time and
place.

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GAC
George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/mee

Distribution

1@ - Addressees

1 - []

1 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - DDI

1 - DDS&T

1 - NIO CF "Soft"

1 - D/NIO Chrono

1 - NIO/RI

1 - ER

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Executive Registry
74-6583/1

4 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Declassification Paper

1. On 26 September, General Graham wrote you requesting USIB review of certain portions of the Secretary of Defense's Posture Statements for FYs 1963-1973 for declassification as requested by Mr. Morton Halperin.

2. Because of the extensive amount of material that had to be examined carefully before a response could be made to this request, I asked to serve in a consultant capacity and take on this task. He has now done so and makes the following two recommendations:

a. That you reply to General Graham as indicated in the attached letter prepared for your signature.

b. That you circulate to the USIB (along with copies of your response to General Graham) a separate memorandum, also attached, for early discussion of the issues involved.

3. recommendations are thoughtful and well considered. They have been thoroughly checked with all interested components of the NIO structure, the DDI, the DDS&T, the DDA, the IC Staff, the General Counsel and the Legislative Counsel. The texts appended to this note have been reviewed and endorsed by all of the above.

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/20 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000900010001-7

4. Please note that [] proposal has you responding to General Graham as DCI rather than as Chairman of the USIB, even though his request was endorsed to you in the latter capacity. This nuance reflects a point made by several people, including [] that it is as DCI that you submit NIEs and are vested with a statutory responsibility for protecting sensitive sources and methods.

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5. [] has done an excellent piece of work and I find his recommendations persuasive. We have taken considerable care in preparing your response in this particular case since it will doubtless set a precedent with which we will have to live in the future. The amount of coordination involved has been time-consuming but necessary.

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GAC
George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachments

O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/mee 4 December 1974

Distribution

Original of Attachments to General Daniel O. Graham

- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - DDS&T
- 1 - DDI
- 1 - D/OSR
- 1 - D/DCI/IC
- 1 - OGC
- 1 - USIB Executive Secretary
- 1 - USIB Security Committee
- 1 - DDA
- 1 - NIO/SP
- ✓ 1 - D/NIO Chrono
- 1 - Freedom of Information Act file
- 1 - NIO/RI
- 1 - *WEC Gile*

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry
74-6583/2

7 DEC 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Daniel O. Graham, USA
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Your Request for Declassification
Action, dated 26 September 1974

I have carefully studied your request for a determination as to whether certain portions of the Secretary of Defense's Posture Statements for FYs 1963-1973, dealing with the strategic threat from the USSR and China, can be declassified and released, as requested by Morton H. Halperin. My basic conclusions are as follows:

1. There would be strong basis for objection if the request were for declassification of the actual estimates on which these passages were based -- i.e., the annual NIEs on Soviet and Chinese strategic military forces -- particularly within ten years of publication. In my view, these NIEs, because of the critical importance of their subject matter, their comprehensiveness, the all-source basis on which they are constructed and their detailed discussion of intelligence methods, have a sensitivity far transcending that of most other intelligence documents.

2. On the other hand, the Secretary of Defense's annual Posture Statements are policy documents which draw only selectively on the NIEs and in fact are routinely subjected to sanitization and declassification for publication in the transcripts of the hearings in which they were presented. Thus, the question becomes one of whether further declassification would be appropriate.

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3. From the standpoint of protecting sensitive intelligence sources and methods, I can see no objection to declassification and release, for the years given, of one major category of material which has been routinely deleted from the unclassified versions of the Posture Statements -- the assessments of the growth and potential ultimate size of major Soviet strategic force components -- i.e., ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. Despite their undoubted sensitivity at the time they were issued, these estimates are now of only historical significance; except for one table -- drawn from the DIPP rather than the NIEs -- none of the projections goes past mid-1973. Although they reveal past uncertainties and sometimes divisions over how to assess the Soviet strategic buildup, they reveal no factual material the Soviets don't know we have. I also can see no objection to the declassification of the comparable discussion of Chinese force levels.

4. With respect to the descriptive material on Soviet and Chinese strategic forces in the Posture Statements, the Statements for FYs 1971-73 have already been extensively declassified, reflecting an increased recent willingness to acknowledge U.S. ability to collect important kinds of information by national technical means. In my view, the Department of Defense would be justified in asserting that little if any further declassification could be made of these Statements without jeopardizing the results if not the existence of sensitive intelligence sources and methods. On the other hand, I can see no objection to the Department of Defense's declassifying much of the previously withheld descriptive material in earlier Posture Statements, using the same standards and procedures used to protect sensitive sources and methods with more recent Posture Statements.

5. Accordingly, I have no objection to the declassification and release of the Posture Statements in question along the lines outlined above.

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6. Under the circumstances, I see no need for formal USIB review of the documents in question. However, your request does call attention to some fundamental issues that USIB members should be thinking about. Accordingly, I propose to circulate this memorandum, and an attached staff memorandum, for USIB discussion at an early date.

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Request for Declassification Action

The Problem

1. By memorandum of 26 September, General Graham has requested USIB review of a request by Morton H. Halperin for declassification and release of those portions of the Secretary of Defense's annual Posture Statements to Congress for Fiscal Years 1963-1973 which deal with the strategic threat from the USSR and China. Mr. Halperin's request was evidently prompted by an invitation from the magazine Foreign Policy to reply to an article by Albert Wohlstetter ("Is There a Strategic Arms Race?") which appeared in its Summer 1974 issue. The basic thesis of Mr. Wohlstetter's article is that the U.S. has systematically underestimated the growth and ultimate size of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces and has persistently understated the future strength of the strategic bomber force by postulating a phasing out of older models which never materialized. This conclusion is derived from a series of 30 charts evaluating 51 long-range "predictions" of ICBM, SLBM and bomber strength which appeared in the Secretary of Defense's Posture Statements for FY 1963-1972 inclusive. These charts, prepared at a SECRET level, were downgraded to unclassified by the Department of Defense for Mr. Wohlstetter's use.

2. All but the FY 1963 Posture Statement draw clearly and explicitly on the then current strategic military National Intelligence Estimates, with particular reference to the Intelligence Community's judgments at the time of the existing and prospective size of major Soviet strategic force components. Thus the request by Mr. Halperin, now research director of

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the Twentieth Century Fund's study on national security, raises some fundamental questions as to how we handle our responsibilities under the Freedom of Information Act -- questions that are bound to recur as time goes on. Mr. Halperin will almost certainly argue that he is entitled to the same access as Mr. Wohlstetter and that the information he wants can be released without damage to legitimate security requirements. Indeed, he has specifically called attention, in a brief note in the Fall issue of Foreign Policy, to his request for release of the Posture Statements cited by Mr. Wohlstetter. Failure to deal responsibly and defensibly with his request, in compliance with the Freedom of Information Act, could lead to court action and increased Congressional pressures for speedier declassification procedures.

General Findings

3. As a general proposition, the annual strategic military NIEs themselves should probably continue to be regarded as representing a special order of sensitivity, because of their comprehensiveness and virtually unparalleled status as all-source documents. They are typically bulky publications designed to provide the President and his advisors with all relevant details on how our critical intelligence judgments were derived. Thus their special quality reflects not only the sensitivity of the individual items of intelligence contained in them but their breadth and depth of coverage.

4. For practical purposes of supporting the policy-makers, to be sure, we have in the past published sanitized TOP SECRET versions of many of these estimates, and we allow material derived from them, suitably sanitized, to appear in SECRET and even unclassified versions of documents like the Secretary of Defense's Posture Statements. But the NIEs themselves should not be considered subject to declassification until they no longer provide a good basis for assessing the Intelligence Community's present and future overall capabilities and limitations in the strategic intelligence field. After ten years, good grounds perhaps

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might be found for declassification on a case-by-case basis. Over shorter periods the older estimate would more and more resemble the current version.

5. The Posture Statements, however, are policy documents which draw selectively from the estimates and are thus more open to item-by-item declassification action. In varying degree, they have already been routinely sanitized and downgraded from SECRET for publication in the unclassified transcript of the Congressional hearings at which they were presented. Indeed, beginning with Secretary Laird's FY 1971 Posture Statement, the unclassified version of which includes a 21-page annex on the "size and character of the threat," the bulk of the classified texts have been released, reflecting greatly increased willingness to acknowledge the ability of national technical collection systems to count ICBM sites, monitor missile tests, and the like. Some deployment numbers have been rounded and simplified, and a number of other details have properly been omitted to protect the results if not the existence of sensitive collection and analytical procedures. In these later Posture Statements, however, the only major omissions have been the discussions of future force levels. This is of particular relevance with the FY 1971 presentation, the classified version of which contains a table showing explicitly how earlier projections of Soviet ICBM and SLBM strength had had to be revised upward as new deployment data became available.

6. Mr. Halperin's request thus poses three questions:

- How sensitive, from the point of view of protecting intelligence sources and methods, are the estimates of possible future force levels which Mr. Halperin is presumably most interested in obtaining?
- What basis, if any, is there for further declassifying the descriptive material in the later (FY 1971-1973) Posture Statements?

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- What problems, if any, would be created by attempting to declassify the descriptive material in earlier Posture Statements, using the standards applied with the FY 1971 statement and subsequently to protect sensitive data?

Specific Findings

7. A review of the classified discussions of the current and future Soviet force levels contained in the Posture Statements provides no persuasive basis for objecting to their declassification and release. This is true despite their undoubted sensitivity at the time of their initial presentation, their revelation of differences within the Intelligence Community (as in the evidence of dissenting Army and Air Force views in the FY 1964 Statement), their failure at various times to fully anticipate what actually developed, and the possible inclusion of some minor errors of observation in describing the status of strategic deployments at the times the estimates of future force growth were made. The Soviets are well aware of our ability to monitor the buildup of their strategic forces, and any additional insight they might derive from these documents about how close to the mark we were in the period up through early 1972 are likely to be of only historical interest. The "predictions" of future force levels, both in the early years and in the later period in which alternative projections were constructed, ultimately reflect the subjective judgments of analysts and their superiors about which was almost universally acknowledged to be a highly uncertain future. The only projections in the Posture Statements in question which go past mid-1973 are those in a DIPP table used in the FY 1972 Statement -- presented in March 1971, well over a year before the SALT Interim Agreement limits came into effect -- which projects ICBM, SLBM and heavy bomber figures for mid-1972, mid-1974 and mid-1976.

8. From the standpoint of protection of the security of USIB materials, there would appear to be

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no basis for objection to the Department of Defense's declassifying the descriptive material in the pre-FY 1971 Posture Statements, using the same standards and procedures it employed in sanitizing the FY 1971 and later Posture Statements to protect sensitive sources and methods -- even though such declassification would presumably confirm the existence of some historical uncertainties in the Intelligence Community on such subjects as the mission of the Tallinn system.

9. The Department of Defense would appear to be justified if it were to refuse further declassification of the FY 1971-1973 Posture Statements except for the release of the analytical chart on ICBM and SLBM projections contained in the appendix to the FY 1971 Statement. Although the continuing validity of a few deletions might now be questioned, the bulk of them appear to be fully justified.

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NIO # 2685-74

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

4 December 1974

Lt. General Daniel O. Graham, USA
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency

Dear Dan:

Attached is a copy of Ed Ratkovich's 30 November cable (which you have already received). It relates to the matter we were discussing in our telephone conversation after my return from Europe. While at EUCOM, I was given a very good briefing by a couple of sharp officers in the J-2 structure on the whole question of Soviet doctrine and the steps that Pact forces would have to take before actually commencing hostilities. In this context, I am not talking about strategic deployments but about final actions that would be necessary even if a basic decision had been made to initiate hostilities with only those troops already deployed in forward areas, without (prior to D-Day) any additional deployment of reserves from the western USSR.

As we discussed, the work that Ed's people are doing in this area parallels work being done by OSR (e.g., the briefing you recently received) and, of course, by people within your own organization. My Vietnam experience taught me that when you have separate groups of people toiling in essentially similar vineyards, it is useful to get them together in one room to compare notes and ideas informally and frankly. It was to this end that I suggested the idea of a seminar, an idea which Ed grabbed quickly and which I said I would broach to you upon my return.

I tried to make the point to Ed that such a seminar would be most useful if its participants were knowledgeable indians, steeped in the actual evidence, rather than chiefs prone to vote institutional stock. My thought would be two or three such indians from EUCOM with matching counterparts from OSR and DIA, who could convene for a day or two to review their thoughts on Soviet doctrine and, especially, on those final actions that would have to be taken prior to any actual

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launching of an attack. I would not expect the seminar to produce any paper or consensus judgment. Instead, I would see it as a vehicle for the kind of working-level dialogue that can be helpful in many ways and is sometimes most helpful if specific reports are not required, though some sort of reportorial record of the discussion and areas of agreement or disagreement would be enlightening.

As you will readily recognize, this drill is closely related to what I consider actually involved

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The judgment implicit in that scenario is misconstrued in many quarters as a comforting assurance that, even in a worst case, intelligence will be able to provide NATO governments with 48 hours warning time. I do not think it means that at all. Instead, it seems to me that the valid theses here involved amount to a statement that there are indeed a series of actions which would have to precede the actual initiation of hostilities -- some of which we should be able to spot if we know what to look for -- but that all of these actions can be taken in a time frame measured in hours. Putting the case this way conveys quite a different impression but (in my opinion) a much more accurate one.

It would probably be more appropriate for you to answer Ed's cable than me (though if you want me to send him a reply I will, of course, do so). If you still think the seminar idea is a sound one, I would appreciate your taking whatever steps are necessary to lay on the essential mechanics and administrative details. We can easily provide a meeting room at Langley if such quarters are in scarce supply at the Pentagon.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,



George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

cc: General Wilson

Mr. Knoche

GACarver, Jr./kes

Original - Addressee

cys - as indicated

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1 - RI

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3 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant General Samuel Wilson, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community Staff

SUBJECT : The FY 1975 KIQ Strategy Reports

1. Attached is a copy of my 16 November memorandum to the DCI by which I forwarded to him 61 of the 69 KIQ Strategy Reports for FY 1975. (Copies of these reports were sent to you under a 29 November memorandum signed [redacted]) This copy shows the DCI's marginal comments and also appended is a copy of his buckslip to me outlining some additional thoughts and instructions.

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2. As you will see, he would like to develop a simple matrix for these Strategy Reports which would summarize in very brief compass which USIB member agencies had agreed to accept responsibilities under each KIQ.

3. I plan to send these Strategy Reports to the USIB principals as soon as they can be reproduced. They should be in the mail by the end of this week. Since both General Walters and I will be absent next week and since honorable members need time to peruse this bulky package, I am suggesting that the KIQ Strategy Reports be considered, per the DCI's wishes, at the USIB meeting on Thursday, 19 December. The DCI will want to have his matrix available as a discussion aid at that meeting. I have asked [redacted] to work with members of your staff (presumably [redacted]) in developing a draft of the matrix which you and I can consider and then show to the DCI for his final endorsement.

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George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Atts
cc: [redacted]

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Original - Addressee w/atts

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Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	LC		
2	DDCI			12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T			14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI			15	AO/DCI		
6	DDA			16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D/DCI/IC			18			
9	D/DCI/NIO	✓		19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

These are really quite good — Let us distribute them to USIB members for info & comment as desired, with a date for a general discussion of them — The point should be made that they will serve as a basis for 1975's evaluation next summer — I'd also like IC to prepare a matrix presentation & discussion

at USIB along following lines:

	State		CIA		NSA	DIA		Treasury		NRO	et
	Coll	Prod	Coll	Prod		Coll	Prod	Coll	Prod		
KIQ											
KIQ 1											
KIQ 2	Red	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Red	Red	Green	etc
KIQ 3											
etc											

Meaning the Agency will
or will not ~~do~~ more
than incidental work
on that KIQ
(everyone does
incidental)

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NIO # 2539-74

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NIO # 2648-74

16 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : FY 1975 KIQ Strategy Reports

1. As you know, there are 69 Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1975. Attached are draft Strategy Reports for 61 of those questions. The status of the remaining eight is as follows:

a. NIO/SP is still working on [redacted] [redacted]. The enormous task of 11-3/8-74 slowed the strategic fraternity down for understandable reasons.

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b. [redacted] are in abeyance. We will either have to get someone to serve as NIO in the very near future or make some form of alternate arrangements on this account.

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c. [redacted] is still working on [redacted] (the complex one on the likelihood of [redacted] political action and subversion). I asked him to take this on along with [redacted] on terrorism, since it cuts across so many accounts and all of the other NIOs were busy in their own parishes. (The Strategy Report [redacted] is included in the attached package.)

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2. These draft Strategy Reports have been sent to component heads in the USIB member agencies as they have been completed for their information, so that the line managers may get some indication of the total resource sums of the commitment checks their representatives have signed in the various working groups addressing these KIQs on an individual basis.

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3. Save for the three [] the ones outstanding should be in hand by COB next Friday, though it will require an additional day or so to edit and reproduce them in a form analogous to the ones here included.

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4. You can start taking the KIQs up before USIB as soon as you want to after that, though there are several considerations you should weigh and will have to decide. One is whether you want USIB to address these drafts or whether you personally would like some changes made in them before they are formally submitted for comment and concurrence by USIB principals. Also, they could be taken up at USIB in one single package or addressed serially in logically grouped packages of, say, ten or twenty. The former procedure would produce a very long session but if you want to inhibit too much discussion and carping, might be preferable. The latter would give honorable members more time to address and focus on specific Strategy Reports -- something you may or may not want them to have.

No →
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment
[]

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*I think these are about the
limit of the attention span
of the members*

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